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The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets*
I keep secrets. Even though I am told over and over by white feminists that we
must reveal ourselves, open ourselves, I keep secrets. Disclosing our secrets
threatens our survival. (Lugones, 2003, 11)
Postcolonial and other oppositional literature introduces many readers to
secrets from the social margins, sometimes only mentioning them, sometimes
sharing their content. Moving beyond colonialism and other forms of
oppression is as much a goal as a description of this writing. Because survival
may be threatened, the question arises in what circumstances feminists should
expect the secrets of oppressed people to be shared, and so in what
circumstances we should investigate or reveal them. This issue seems to
confound the central claim of standpoint epistemologists — postcolonial,
feminist, or otherwise — that there is cognitive value in learning from people’s
experiences of oppression (Harding 1991; Hartsock 1986, Mills 1998). Whether
or not one shares similar experiences, standpoint theorists argue, to begin
thought from the perspective of “others” and “other ‘others’”, as Sandra
Harding (1991) puts it, provides an epistemic advantage. Secrets concerned
with resistance, such as in the Underground Railroad, women’s shelters and
lesbian passing, must be especially valuable and relevant to developing
knowledge from a standpoint, because activism is supposed to be necessary to
acquire the advantage. Yet, revealing aspects of resistance so vulnerable that
they are kept secret risks undermining the potential of those secrets for
resisting and opposing oppression. Thus, the epistemological value of

oppositional secrecy seems to conflict with standpoint theorists’ advice of
emancipatory activism.
The case of oppositional secrecy seems to indicate an exception to
standpoint theory, a case in which emancipatory politics does not encourage
but prohibits sharing understanding. However, as I will argue, the need to
preserve oppositional secrecy is not an exception to, but only a limited case of,
standpoint epistemology. Some understanding that might be gained is not
barred by political considerations, but political distinctions do indicate when
and where the cognitive value of such understandings tapers off. The cognitive
significance of exposing hidden understanding reduces in cases of extreme
political vulnerability that morally require secrecy.

Standpoint Knowledge
Cognitive value arises from a standpoint in two different ways. The first
is from accessing suppressed knowledge, understandings that people in power
or systems of power currently obscure. Bringing a view from the social
margins to the attention of epistemic agents beyond the oppressed group
moves it into spheres where it can be of benefit to, and where it can benefit
from, engaging with mainstream intellectual resources. More original (in a
literal sense) to marginalized perspectives is the second form, underdeveloped
knowledge, including tacit understanding and practical wisdom.
Underdeveloped understandings must initially provide benefit to, and be
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developed by, people who experience a common form of oppression. Only once
appreciated as shared aspects of life can tacit understandings and practical
wisdom become transferable knowledge. At that point, coalition and exchange
with other communities becomes possible that is both politically directed and
epistemologically fruitful (at least if not suppressed).
Both suppressed and underdeveloped knowledge provide special
cognitive value only insofar as they are based on experiences of people in
oppressed groups that tend to be difficult to access. Because of oppression,
people in some groups do not have access to resources that facilitate
individuals’ learning, such as books or a decent breakfast. Moreover, isolated
individuals won’t develop strong communal perspectives. Isolation from others
who share experiences of the same form of oppression makes experiences of
marginalization seem idiosyncratic, or personal rather than political. This
applies directly to women, gay men, and especially lesbians, because
compound oppressions tend to compound isolation. Therefore, a communal
perspective may require consciousness-raising and separatism. Indirectly, but
no less powerfully, some forms of oppression isolate people from each other by
restricting education and literacy, and so limiting the ability to share
experience and understanding. Articulating the common nature of experiences
of oppression not only reveals the breadth of an experienced phenomenon,
such as sexual harassment or racial violence; it also reveals the contingent
political situation that obscures those experiences.
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So, resisting oppression provides political wisdom, and Blacks learn from
Blacks, women from women, and lesbians from lesbians. Also, single straight
women and lesbians learn from each other about the privilege of heterosexual
monogamy and how it fosters sexism; Latino/as, Native North Americans, and
Blacks learn from each other about racism, and so on.
However, even unified perspectives may be suppressed. Actively seeking
out marginalized views is necessary for bringing together all potential
approaches. Africanists may learn from feminists, lesbians may learn from
Quebecois francophones, and iconic straight White heterosexual Western ablebodied men may learn from us all. Only less can be learned from the political
center, because people in that situation already receive a disproportionate
amount of attention.
The development for political reasons of views from the social margins
has a distinctively epistemological result because it encourages effective
egalitarian social sharing of information (Harding 1991). Effective sharing
requires both counteracting the social pressures that marginalize some
perspectives, and making sure that experiences of life at the margins develop
into generalizable perspectives. Even canonical Western philosophers (e.g. Mill
1956) recognize cognitive value in the consideration of multiple perspectives.
Learning from a range of positions (social or ideological) is cognitively valuable
in order to counteract people’s stubbornness and science’s undemocratic
tendencies.
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Working against the underdevelopment and suppression of views from
the social margins requires special attention to these views. This involves
affirmative action in the name of stricter cognitive standards. Of course,
benefiting the understanding of people in general by developing perspectives
from the margins is no straightforward matter. In addition to the general
problems of moving “from margin to center,” particular situations of political
oppression and corresponding cognitive resources require particularized
accounts. Nevertheless, in general, knowledge improves when addressed to the
interests of people on the social margins, and reflects their concerns and
problems that otherwise tend to be sidelined or remain isolated. In this way,
for instance, as Patricia Hill Collins argues, insider-outsiders, who resist a
particular form of oppression but who have some access to the authority of the
political center, help create better sociology (1991). i

Oppositional Secrecy
The very nature of secrecy makes it difficult to find examples — and so
much the worse because suppression and underdevelopment make
understanding from an oppressed perspective difficult to recognize. However,
even a thoroughly privileged Western feminist can discern two forms of
oppositional secrecy. First, oppressed people build covert networks to escape
or mitigate oppression, as in the case of the Underground Railroad or illegal
systems providing contraceptive information and services. Second, people
belonging to an oppressed group may “pass” as having a more politically
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central identity. For instance, Blacks may pass as White, or gays and lesbians
pass as straight; indeed, all sorts of passing is possible through marriage and
name-changes.
These two types of oppositional secrecy take special forms. For instance,
a casual form of secret arises when people covertly share information by using
a language different from the politically dominant tongue. Francophones in
English Canada and Latino/as in the U.S. occasionally make use of this tool
for secrecy, and we can consider it an ad hoc networking provision, an
Underground Railroad in microcosm. The goal is to secure safe passage, not of
whole people or physical provisions, but of information alone, just as some
birth control networks provide.
Some oppositional secrets combine the two strategies of passing and
networking. Passing as a typical house or generic institution may be important
for a women’s shelter, but this requires a network of support by volunteers,
and strict privacy policies that keep the shelter beyond easy access by abusers;
all this together makes it possible for residents to hide their identities. (More
completely covert networks may be necessary for highly endangered clients.)
Likewise, same-sex couples in the United States seeking access to marriage
may use networks to provide temporary addresses and pass as residents of
states that provide access to legal marriage; and in Japan they may pass as
parent and child to gain access to the property rights otherwise afforded to
couples (Maree 2004).
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Another hybrid of passing and networking that disrupts oppression is
secret sabotage, including feigned helplessness, an underground activity that
depends on passing. A slave who intentionally damages farm machinery to
provide another slave time to recuperate from an illness wishes to pass as a
dutiful slave but also to negotiate systematic reprieve for the other (Douglas
1995). Appearing dutiful is also necessary for the mother who intentionally
asks nonsensical questions, or burns dinner and breaks dishes. Her behavior
provides reprieve from the indignity that can infect motherwork, a reprieve
provided by demonstrating to herself her own measure of independence
(Lugones 2003, 5-6).
The effects of secrecy vary according to context and are difficult to
predict. What is meant to be oppositional may instead be collaborative, and
generally involves both. Any oppositional activity is likely to be “curdled”, that
is both blended with repressive aspects, and ambiguous in the face of
interlocking oppressions (Lugones 1994; 2003, 8-16). On the oppositional side,
consider how passing tends be more useful for lesbians than gay men who may
confront heterosexism without the complications of sexism (Card 1995). Yet, for
lesbians, passing entails a special risk of collaboration: the invisibility of
lesbian identity encourages neglect of lesbian issues and dismissal of specific
lesbian concerns as merely personal or at best marginal and insignificant.
Thus, lesbian invisibility can perpetuate lesbians’ minority status; indeed, any
case of passing can perpetuate servility to the dominant culture, and so
undermine personal dignity (Card 1995, 120). So, the strategy of passing is
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easily corrupted. Note how passing as White is fraught for African-Americans
seeking the benefits of skin privilege, who may therefore perceive themselves
and be perceived by others as traitors.
Unintentional collaboration in oppressive systems is less a danger for
deliberate underground avenues of resistance. Admittedly, a casual linguistic
secret or underground network depends on those in power being substantially
ignorant, and ignorance of marginalized lives can be a source of oppression. ii
The occupation of separate physical and linguistic domains may support
oppressive social systems. Yet, employing the marginalized environment as an
avenue for resistance need not validate the system of privilege in the same way
or to nearly the same degree as acquiring the privileges of the political center
by passing. The ignorance that makes possible underground networks does
not directly create the oppressive environment. In no immediate sense does a
slave-owner’s ignorance of survival means in the wild oppress the slaves, or a
Canadian anglophone’s ignorance of the French language oppress
francophones.iii
However, collaboration may result indirectly from even the most pointed
of oppositional actions, and thus to hidden emancipatory networks. The
success of the Underground Railroad was double-edged, as warned abolitionist
and escaped slave, Frederick Douglas. Of course, some slaves gained hope and
abolitionists gained inspiration from hearing of it. However, even the very
limited awareness of it available to slave-holders, an awareness that might be
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dismissed as rumour, could make the slave-holders extra vigilant, and may
ultimately have served their interests more than the slaves (Douglas 1995, 60).
Despite such frequently ambiguous implications of political secrecy, it
certainly can be very effective, and it is not a strategy unique to the oppressed.
Covert networks and disguises also undermine legitimate forms of social
control. Still, underground systems of prisoners whose social suppression is
politically warranted can be left out of this discussion, at least insofar as we
can distinguish between oppression and politically warranted suppression.
Inmates in a prison may find means of sharing drugs and weapons, and for
continued illegal and immoral behavior, means that resemble those of Jews in
a concentration camp for sharing food and water; yet revealing unjust networks
poses no problem for standpoint theory. The relevant difference is not the
materials exchanged and particular activities of networks, which only illustrate
the contrast with networks mobilized against oppression. What morally
distinguishes the cases – or aspects of the cases, as they are curdled – is the
purpose for the form of underground network, whether the goal is politically
justified. People imprisoned as a result of racist or classist social policies that
may, for instance, lead them to steal in order to eat, have oppositional
knowledge. Their perspective provides cognitive advantage, productive
alternative perspectives.
As for networks, so for passing. Consider the moral dilemmas of Blacks
passing as White in the Harlem renaissance that provide the backdrop for Nella
Larsen’s novel, “Passing” (1997), Gertrude’s passing as White motivated by love
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is sympathetic, and so it is interesting for standpoint theory. By contrast,
standpoint theorists can find little of cognitive significance in Gertrude’s friend,
Clare, passing as White insofar as it is motivated by luxury. Straightforward
social climbing is not politically justified and reflects only a mainstream
perspective. Apparent similarities between oppositional secrets and other
forms of secrecy need not confound people who use standpoint epistemology.

Political Value
Given the two distinguishable forms of oppositional secrecy, the question
remains what political reasons generally keep people who oppose oppression
from revealing or investigating the secrets of the oppressed despite the
potential understanding to be gained. How does a person guided by standpoint
theory decide when an oppositional secret may be revealed? How does an
intellectual activist against oppression, who may or may not share a particular
experience of oppression, know when to resist revealing or investigating
politically justified secrecy?
Whether one shares the particular experience of oppression, or shares
the secret itself, the most obvious reasons for respecting the secrets of the
oppressed rely on moral and political considerations. The political project of
emancipation depends on keeping the secret, at least to some extent or in some
way, and so an inquirer must be aware that violating the secrecy jeopardizes
those who participate in it. The cost may be even their lives. Clearly, no
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foreseeable substantial moral or political threat to the participants in a secret
can result from a permissible revelation.
How is the threat to the oppositional project recognized and evaluated?
People tend to resolve such dilemmas by seeking out those who share in the
form of oppression, and those who are already trusted in sharing the secret. In
the wrong hands secrets are dangerous, can be misused, and indeed can
reinforce the circumstances of oppression, however noble one’s intentions. The
type of ignorance encouraged by social privilege may make a knower unaware
of the dangerous implications of a particular piece of knowledge for the welfare
of marginalized people. Consider how White or straight folks may be oblivious
as they “out” and thus endanger a person who is passing. To ward off the
potential danger, we appeal to the immorality of disrespecting the secrets of
others. The decision of when and how to reveal a secret is left as much as
possible to the judgment of those whose secret it is.iv The more removed one is
from the content being hidden − whether or not the circumstance involves
oppression, but with special care if it does − the less political authority one has
to evaluate that circumstance and to investigate or share the secret.v So, one
avoids revealing or inquiring into the sexual or racial identity of others. The
person or people in question judge best the full practical and political import of
open identification.
Of course, deference to people who are party more than oneself to the
secret only practically postpones the issue of secret revelation, leaving open at
least two problems.vi First, in most cases, it is not clear who is an insider to
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the secret and who an outsider. For instance, one may know that a secret
exists on some topic or among some people, but not know other details.
Moreover, being aware of the incompleteness of one’s understanding tends to
motivate inquiry. Most people faced with decisions about revealing or
investigating secrets are both insiders and outsiders: they are insiders insofar
as they know at least that there is a secret, even if they have stumbled upon it
accidentally; and they are outsiders insofar as they are interested themselves
in a deeper understanding of it, or insofar as they are connected with people
who don’t share but might be interested in it. Second, deference to insiders
does not resolve philosophically the issue of how insiders, and partial insiders
who are the majority of concerned actors, decide for themselves and for others.
A variety of ethical, pragmatic and social considerations come into play
in deciding whether an oppositional secret may be revealed or investigated.
However, whether their significance is greater than the potential for improving
the community’s knowledge by sharing the secret is a further matter.

From Political to Epistemological Evaluation
Whether to reveal or investigate oppositional secrecy concerns knowledge
writ large: not apolitical, timeless, placeless, disembodied knowledge, but the
knowledge of marginalized communities as they exist in combination with other
communities, that are smaller or larger, and politically central or differently
marginalized. People in these other communities are also cognitive
beneficiaries of oppositional politics. Admittedly, the ways in which knowledge
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might serve the oppressed was the original issue for standpoint epistemology
(Smith 1974; Harding 1986; 1991). Standpoint theorists contest the ways in
which science serves men at the expense of women, for instance by not testing
medications on women, and then assuming women respond as men do.
However, an emancipated science benefits not only the oppressed. The
community in general is supposed to gain understanding by thinking from the
perspective of “others” and “other ‘others’” (Rose 1983; Harding 1991). So, to
be justified according to standpoint epistemology, revealing oppositional
secrecy should improve the knowledge of all, or perhaps in utilitarian terms,
provide the greatest understanding for the greatest number.
Can cognitive advantage to the general community be sufficient to
outweigh the political disadvantage of marginalized people losing a strategic
secret? Does it make sense to think this way? Weighing cognitive against
political values seems like comparing apples with oranges. On the other hand,
speaking as if cognition can be wholly separated from and contrasted with
political or ethical values not only sounds crass it can only be a heuristic for
identifying conflicting interests. Such dichotomies are denied by feminist
philosophers of science (Longino 1997; Nelson and Nelson 1995), and
particularly by standpoint theorists (Hartsock 1983; Rose 1983), who maintain
that the cognitive value to accrue from obtaining an oppositional standpoint is
always politically dependent. If the secrets are used to resist oppression, the
political interests clearly take priority, but it is not clear just how much priority
relative to the epistemological interests. Yet, an account of the intersection
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between political and epistemological interests can aid responsible inquiry,
both personal and scientific. Distinguishing epistemological concerns may be
artificial, but still informative, if only because people tend to divide up human
interests by separating cognitive from ethical and political values.
The epistemological value of a standpoint depends on there being a
political center and contrasting social margins. Without the existence of
oppression, no perspective provides a special epistemological advantage. A
certain cognitive value derives from a particular form of oppression up until the
point at which we eradicate it. With the achievement of social justice comes
the elimination of what made that perspective demand special political and
cognitive attention. Without oppression, understanding from a particular
social perspective is no longer underdeveloped or suppressed, and so it brings
no special cognitive advantage (Figure 1).

Cognitive advantage

Figure 1: Promoting Underdeveloped or
Suppressed Understanding

Decreasing oppression over time
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Epistemological Value
I suggest that just as for both suppressed and underdeveloped
knowledge, political conditions can be portrayed in epistemological terms in the
case of oppositional secrecy. There are both cognitive and political reasons for
respecting the authority of those experiencing oppression. This means that
decisions about investigating or revealing secrets can be covered in the terms of
a standpoint epistemology, and are not simply a matter of the political values
outweighing the epistemological. What appears to be an ethical trumping of
cognitive interests is simply a nonstarter in cognitive terms that cannot
motivate the revelation of politically necessitated secrets. Little potential for
gaining understanding about the world can arise from perspectives that are
extremely vulnerable because of political circumstances.
Admittedly, secrecy restricts access to certain information and cognitive
skills, detracting from the flow of information that makes multiple perspectives
available, and that benefits a community in general. For those who don’t share
the secret, especially perhaps whom are pointedly deceived — the slaveholders,
batterers and homophobes, the withheld wisdom could be very valuable.
Recall, however, that liberatory political commitments are vital to the
development of epistemic advantage from a standpoint. It belongs less, for
instance, to women or Blacks than to feminists or Africanists. The
circumstances of oppression must be problematized to reveal and develop the
significance of that perspective for the future and the larger world; experience
and testimony are only starting places for reasoning. Novel theories about the
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workings of the world that may serve to inform the larger community emerge
from experiences at the social margins after being refined by scrutiny and
discussion among peers (Collins 2001; Wylie 1992).
What counts as activism appropriate for opposing oppression depends on
the judgments and perceived needs of those experiencing that form of
oppression, such as slaves, abused women, and lesbians. Their political goals
set limits on the cognitive value that might derive from their perspective. Black
activism, for instance, can appear to non-Blacks as mere socializing (Collins
2001). Outsiders’ respect for the self-determination of the people they would
emancipate and the degree to which they recognize the insiders’ purposes
restricts the knowledge outsiders might gain.
Only if revealing a secret is expedient in the eyes of those who hold it, is
it justified morally, and so justified epistemologically. Just as the
epistemological value of a standpoint declines when oppression recedes, it
must also decline when a social situation is so politically precarious that
knowledge must be hidden, and the fragility of any situation tends to be best
judged by those close to it.
Consider how to recognize on cognitive grounds the importance of
maintaining the anonymity of women one knows or studies who reside in a
shelter. Those details might provide salience to a theory or a belief, or answer
a problem. However, the purpose of such a revelation can be only immediately
practical; it won’t provide the long-term functionality sufficient to consider it
cognitively valuable.
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For instance, the value of a women’s shelter’s anonymity derives from
mitigating the conditions of domestic violence. Only in regard to that barrier or
resistance is the knowledge of the details about the shelter significant in longer
cognitive terms rather than merely immediate practical terms. Should the
practical political barrier against domestic violence become ineffective, the
information concealed — the details of who resides, and so on — becomes less
significant of the world. It only serves the fleeting understandings of a few
individuals. An abuser, for instance, might find his or her goals — say of
continued abuse or harassment — served by that information. Yet, that one
person or few people matter little in the consequentialist epistemologies of
contemporary pragmatist-empiricism and naturalism that support standpoint
theories (Sullivan 2001). Better accuracy or empirical adequacy of knowledge,
or more effective transactions, are developed through engagement with feminist
and other liberatory perspectives.
Likewise, the cognitive value of information surrounding the
Underground Railroad would be less in a world or environment where such
resistance floundered. Only in a world where Africans continue to fight for or
actually progress toward emancipation is there special cognitive value in
learning about the Underground Railroad.
The benefit for an outsider’s understanding of the world diminishes with
the preciousness of the secret. Such understandings are not merely
suppressed or underdeveloped, but valuable because of and therefore
contingent on the possibility of social change. If an understanding is extremely
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vulnerable in the current political climate, there is only a small chance that it
will bear out. The project served by the secret is likely to fail. For instance,
sharing knowledge of the existence of a secret may encourage others to seek
out further details, and endanger the plans and corresponding projection of the
world, as Frederick Douglas worried. Whatever aspect of a secret is revealed,
revelation of the information tends to change the political nature of the world
and can undermine the secret’s cognitive potential if that potential is fragile.
Fresh scrutiny will face the sabotaging wife should others become aware that
there is some secret regarding her behavior. Their watchful eyes will make it
difficult for her to continue to act out, and so will amplify the oppression she
experiences.
The extreme case of genocide demonstrates vividly how political necessity
mitigates epistemological values. There approaches nothing to learn of the
future world from the understandings of peoples who do not survive. Although
there is much to learn from them about their oppression, that oppression stops
being part of the world as those oppressed people stop being part of the world.
The world becomes less the world those people lived in and understood, and
their perspectives decline in relevance and epistemological value.vii
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Cognitive advantage

Figure 2: Sharing Oppositional Secrets

Decreasing oppression over time

In the moderate case of a shelter, clients’ identities also have less and
less bearing on the world to the extent that the world shifts away from being a
world where women are safe and those individuals survive and thrive. Given
that clients need shelter from abuse, a funding agency, for instance, has little
to learn from their identities. Identifying individuals does not enhance the
shelter’s hedge against their oppression and negotiations with the world in that
service. The limited success of individual cases provides examples to learn
from, but only in regard to that degree of success does information about
individuals’ identities become relevant. Epistemological significance depends
on there being an element of political success or promise, a factor that
diminishes in extreme cases of oppression. (Figure 2)
When people masquerade as victims to gain access to a shelter’s
resources, the issue of understanding who receives the benefits becomes more
practical and political, and is less a matter for standpoint theory as an
epistemology.viii Oppression isn’t resisted by secreting an abuser. So, revealing
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an abuser who masquerades as abused may teach a great deal about the
current reality and many likely futures. The potential reality served by an
abuser’s masquerade is the status quo.
Mainstream views are always somewhat cognitively relevant, though not
specially advantageous, as I argued above. Yet, there is less to gain cognitively
from someone who cries abuse to escape devastating poverty than from
someone whose masquerade serves ignoble ends. The unjust secret can teach
about the world as it is, whereas the oppositional secret can teach more about
the world as it might be.
Whatever motivation there is for secret understandings, their cognitive
value largely depends on how the world is shaped by politics now and in the
possible future. The more access abusers have to their victims, the less
difference the victims’ meager secrets can make, even to the victims
themselves, and the less real is the content of those secrets, in both a literal
and a psychological sense. It is less possible for gays and lesbians to pass, and
so less informative that they do, so long as they are persecuted. The more
thoroughgoing and accepted is slavery, the less the Underground Railroad can
work to develop and preserve Africans’ culture, self-esteem, and individual
lives. The knowledge kept secret by people who suffer these forms of
oppression is useful and true only to the extent that the world might support
the value and the legitimacy of those people’s lives, a possibility that is
threatened and undermined by oppression. Secrets of the oppressed are
meaningful views of the world and have cognitively important consequences
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especially to the extent that those secrets support an otherwise endangered
moral status and provide for political emancipation, which is to say, to the
extent that they have morally desirable consequences. Likewise, to the extent
that oppositional politics require secrecy on moral grounds, the cognitive
returns of revealing those secrets diminish: little is told of the present world.

Conclusion
Oppositional secrecy does not deliver the epistemological dilemma for
standpoint theories that it seems to on first glance. Rather, if the present
political environment makes secrecy valuable, then there is a substantial
threat to the political future protected, but to some extent only projected or
viewed as a future possibility, by the secret. Understanding threats to
marginalized views of the world is implicit to the political considerations that
usually guide decisions about respecting the authority of secret-holders.
Oppositional secrets must be made or kept relevant to the world by initial steps
progressing against oppression and toward making an egalitarian future real,
in order that the secrets become more than idle hopes and dreams. In such
cases, political concerns do not override epistemological concerns, but political
circumstances make the epistemological value highly vulnerable.
That epistemology can capture the reasons for preserving oppositional
secrets does not imply that cognitive terms should be used for making
decisions. To the contrary, because the usual political terms with which we
confront oppositional secrets track also cognitive aspects of the issue, we may
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rest assured that we are not neglecting a full range of human values. Political
vulnerabilities that recommend keeping or respecting a secret indicate that the
knowledge to be gained is tenuous. So, the political concerns that motivate
oppositional secrecy target epistemological implications. Political values have
cognitive aspects, just as feminist philosophers of science show that cognitive
values have political aspects (Longino 1997; Nelson and Nelson 1995).
The cognitive basis for preserving politically necessitated secrecy reveals
several things about standpoint theory. Most generally, it helps to articulate
exactly what is required for the sort of activism that can produce the epistemic
advantage of a standpoint. Activism is a crucial element, according to the
theory that epistemic advantage derives from experiences of oppression, yet the
notion of activism at work in standpoint theories is opaque. The form of
activism that yields cognitive advantage in the case of oppositional secrecy
reveals the dependence of cognitive advantage on projected possible futures,
and the strength of these futures’ possibility. (How this strength is to be
assessed is an open question, but how the futures projected by current
mainstream interests in the West will fail is probably because they are
unsustainable in the long run, especially unsustainable by the material
environment.) Whereas suppressed knowledge and underdeveloped knowledge
can provide epistemological advantage only so long as oppression remains,
oppositional secrecy reveals that some prospect of success against oppression
is also necessary.
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I very much appreciate Carolyn Smale sharing with me the secrecy issues
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i

Collins uses the terminology of “outsiders within.” However, in other

discussions of standpoint theory, what is inside and what is outside can be
reversed, as it is in this discussion of secrets. To acknowledge this
ambivalence, I adopt Alison Wylie’s terminology (2003).
ii

This demonstrates Charles Mills’ (1997) understanding of ignorance as a

concrete phenomenon, something more than a lack of knowledge. Indeed,
ignorance may function as a tool, and although created to serve oppression it
may be periodically turned against it (pace Audre Lorde).
iii

Admittedly, food banks are networks that foster middle-class ignorance

about hunger as a social problem, and that ignorance deters social change.
Achieving real independence can be frustrated by passing as independent, so
food banks both oppose and reinforce oppression. Further discussion of the
ambiguity of activism is below. However, the collaboration results from those
networks being institutions of the dominant culture, rather than being native
to the poor. Being more thoroughly engaged with the needs of marginalized
people, native networks are less vulnerable to collaboration in oppression.
iv

Detailed discussion of the general moral dynamics of secrecy, including the

priority of individuals in choosing whether or not to keep secrets, can be found
in Sissela Bok (1983).
v

Political assessment of authority contrasts with traditional scientific

assessment of authority based on distance from the subject of study.
vi

In cases where the oppressed are not aware of a secret directed toward their

emancipation, they are not party to it, strictly speaking. The subjects of the
26

secret are only the activists who are privy to it, up until such a point as others
come to share in the secret. People must have access to the secret or else not
really be part of it.
vii

It might be argued that in the case of genocide, we lose forever a cognitive

perspective, and the loss of that resource is epistemologically destructive.
However, not just any view can count as good view, and even the value of
diverse views need not suffer profoundly from the loss of one, because that loss
need not entail a loss in human diversity. Continued diversification of human
practices and epistemic resources is possible because of human plasticity.
viii

This might be addressed by a politics of standpoints or a form of social

epistemology that goes beyond standpoint theory.
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